Cosmological argument Totally Explained

Everything about The Cosmological Argument totally explained

The cosmological argument is a metaphysical argument for the existence of God, or a first mover of the cosmos. It is traditionally known as an "argument from universal causation", an "argument from first cause", "The Causal Argument" and also as an "uncaused cause" or "unmoved mover" argument. Whichever term is used, there are three basic variants of this argument, each with subtle but important distinctions: the argument from causation in esse, the argument from causation in fieri, and the argument from contingency. The cosmological argument doesn't attempt to prove anything about the first cause or about God, except to argue that such a cause must exist. This cause is known in Latin as "causa sui".

Origins of the argument

Plato (who also uses the DA argument, teleological argument) and Aristotle both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats. Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BCE) posited a basic cosmological argument in The Laws (Book X). He argued that motion in the world and in the cosmos was "imparted motion" that would have required some kind of "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain the motion. Plato also posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos in his work Timaeus. For Plato, the demiurge lacked the supernatural ability to create ex nihilo or out of nothing. The demiurge was only able to organize the "anake". The anake was the only other co-existent element or presence in Plato's cosmogony. Aristotle (c. 384–322 BCE) also put forth the idea of a first cause, often referred to as the "Prime Mover" or "Unmoved Mover" (the πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον or primus motor) in his work Metaphysics. For Aristotle too, as for Plato, the underlying "stuff" of the universe always was in existence and always would be (which in turn follows Parmenides' famous statement that "nothing can come from nothing"). Aristotle posited an underlying ousia (an essence or substance) of which the universe is composed, and it's the ousia that the Prime Mover organized and set into motion. The Prime Mover didn't organize matter physically, but is instead a Being who constantly thinks about thinking itself, and who organized the cosmos by making matter the object of "aspiration or desire". The Prime Mover was, to Aristotle, a "thinking on thinking", an eternal process of pure thought.
   Following al-Farabi's lead, Avicenna initiated a full-fledged inquiry into the question of being, in which he distinguished between essence (Mahiat) and existence (Wujud). He argued that the fact of existence can not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things and that form and matter by themselves can't interact and originate the movement of the universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Existence must, therefore, be due to an agent-cause that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must be an existing thing and coexist with its effect.
   The universe consists of a chain of actual beings, each giving existence to the one below it and responsible for the existence of the rest of the chain below. Because an actual infinite is deemed impossible by Avicenna, this chain as a whole must terminate in a being that's wholly simple and one, whose essence is its very existence, and therefore is self-sufficient and not in need of something else to give it existence. Because its existence isn't contingent on or necessitated by something else but is necessary and eternal in itself, it satisfies the condition of being the necessitating cause of the entire chain that constitutes the eternal world of contingent existing things. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274 CE), probably the best known theologian of medieval Europe, adapted the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle and Avicenna to form one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument. His conception of first cause is the idea that the universe must have been caused by something that was itself uncaused, which he asserted was God.
   Many other philosophers and theologians have posited first-cause arguments both before and since Aquinas. The versions sampled in the following sections are representative of the most common derivations of the argument.

The argument

Framed as an informal proof, the first cause argument can be stated as follows:

Every finite and contingent being has a cause.
Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself.
A causal chain can't be of infinite length.
Therefore, there must be a first cause; or, there must be something that isn't an effect.

The cosmological argument can only speculate about the existence of God from claims about the entire universe, unless the "first cause" is taken to mean the same thing as "God". Thus, the argument is based on the claim that God must exist due to the fact that the universe needs a cause. In other words, the existence of the universe requires an explanation, and an active creation of the universe by a being outside of the universe — generally assumed to be God — is that explanation.
In light of the Big Bang theory, a stylized version of cosmological argument for the existence of God has emerged (sometimes called the Kalam cosmological argument, the following form of which was put forth by William Lane Craig):

Whatever begins to exist has a cause.

The universe began to exist.

Therefore, the universe had a cause.

A more detailed discussion of the argument

A basic explanation might go something like this: Consider some event in the universe. No matter which event you choose, it'll be the result of some cause, or more likely a very complex set of causes. Each of those causes would be the result of some other set of causes, which are in turn a result of yet other causes. Thus there's an enormous chain of events in the universe, with the earlier events causing the later events. And either this chain of events has a beginning, or it does not.
Currently, the theory of the cosmological history of the universe most widely accepted by astronomers and astrophysicists includes an apparent first event — the Big Bang — the expansion of all known matter and energy from a superdense, singularity or singular point at some finite time in the past. Though contemporary versions of the cosmological argument most typically assume that there was a beginning to the cosmic chain of physical, or natural causes, the early formulations of the argument didn't have the benefit of this degree of theoretical insight into the apparent origins of the cosmos. The Big Bang Theory, however, doesn't address the issue of the origin of the primordial singularity, so it doesn't address the issue of a 'first cause' in an absolute sense.
Plato's demiurge and Aristotle's Prime Mover each referred to a being who, they speculated, set in motion an already existing "stuff" of the cosmos. A millennium and a half later, Aquinas went on to argue that there's an Uncaused Cause, which is just another name for God. And to Aquinas, it remained logically possible that the universe has already existed for an infinite amount of time, and will continue to exist for an infinite amount of time. In his classic Summa Theologiae, he posited that even if the universe has always existed, (a notion that he rejected on other grounds), there's still the question of cause, or even of "first cause".

The argument from contingency

In the scholastic era, it was unknown whether the universe had a beginning or whether it had always existed, at least in terms of what reason alone can account for. (As a matter of faith the beginning of the world was believed by Christian theists). To account for both possibilities, Aquinas formulated the "argument from contingency". Aquinas follows Aristotle in claiming that there must be something that explains why the universe exists. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably not exist — that's to say, since it's contingent — its existence must have a cause. And that cause can't simply be another contingent thing, it must be something that exists by necessity, that is, it must be something that must exist in order for anything else to exist. In other words, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes that existence to Aristotle's Uncaused Cause, though Aquinas used the words "... and this we understand to be God".
Aquinas' argument from contingency is distinct from a first-cause argument (because it assumes the possibility of a universe that had no beginning in time), but is instead a form of argument from "universal causation". He observed that in nature there are things whose existence is contingent, that is, possible for it to be or not to be. Since it's possible for such things not to exist, there must be some time at which such things didn't in fact exist. Thus, according to Aquinas, there must have been a time when nothing existed. If that's so, there would exist nothing that could bring anything into existence. Thus contingent beings are insufficient to account for the existence of contingent beings, meaning there must exist a Necessary Being for which it's impossible not to exist, and from which the existence of all contingent beings is derived.
The German philosopher Gottfried Leibniz made a somewhat similar argument with his Principle of sufficient reason in 1714. He wrote: "There can be found no fact that's true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we can't know these reasons in most cases". He formulated the cosmological argument succinctly: "Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary Being bearing the reason for its existence within itself." Aristotelian philosopher Mortimer J. Adler devised a refined argument from contingency in his book “How to Think About God”:

The existence of an effect requiring the concurrent existence and action of an efficient cause implies the existence and action of that cause.

The cosmos as a whole exists.

The existence of the cosmos as a whole is radically contingent (meaning that it needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence to preserve it in being, and prevent it from being annihilated, or reduced to nothing).

If the cosmos needs an efficient cause of its continuing existence, then that cause must be a supernatural being, supernatural in its action, and one the existence of which is uncaused, in other words, the Supreme Being, or God. His premise for confirming all of these points was this:

The universe as we know it today isn't the only universe that can ever exist in time. We can infer it from the fact that the arrangement and disarray, the order and disorder, of the present cosmos might have been otherwise. That it might have been different from what it is. That which can't be otherwise also can't not exist; and conversely, what necessarily exists can not be otherwise than it is. Therefore, a cosmos which can be otherwise is one that also can't be; and conversely, a cosmos that's capable of not existing at all is one that can be otherwise than it now is. Applying this insight to the fact that the existing cosmos is merely one of a plurality of possible universes, we come to the conclusion that the cosmos, radically contingent in existence, wouldn't exist at all were its existence not caused. A merely possible cosmos can't be an uncaused cosmos. A cosmos that's radically contingent in existence, and needs a cause of that existence, needs a supernatural cause, one that exists and acts to exnihilate this merely possible cosmos, thus preventing the realization of what is always possible for merely a possible cosmos, namely, its absolute non-existence or reduction to nothingness.

Adler concludes that there exists a necessary being to preserve the cosmos in existence. God must be there to sustain the universe even if the universe is eternal. Beginning by rejecting belief in a creating God, Adler finds evidence of a sustaining God. Thus, the existence of a sustaining God becomes grounds for asserting the creating activity also. The idea of a created universe with a beginning and (most likely) an end now becomes more plausible than the idea of an eternal universe. Adler believed that "to affirm that the world or cosmos had an absolute beginning, that it was exnihilated at an initial instant, would be tantamount to affirming the existence of God, the world's exnihilator."

"In esse" and "in fieri"

The difference between the arguments from causation in fieri and in esse is a fairly important one. In fieri is generally translated as "becoming", while in esse is generally translated as "in existence". In fieri, the process of becoming, is similar to building a house. Once it's built, the builder walks away and it stands of its own accord. (It may require occasional maintenance, but that's beyond the scope of the "first cause" argument.) In esse (in existence) is more akin to the light from a candle or the liquid in a vessel. George Hayward Joyce, SJ, explains that "...where the light of the candle is dependent on the candle's continued existence, not only does a candle produce light in a room in the first instance, but its continued presence is necessary if the illumination is to continue. If it's removed, the light ceases. Again, a liquid receives its shape from the vessel in which it's contained; but were the pressure of the containing sides withdrawn, it wouldn't retain its form for an instant". This form of the argument is far more difficult to separate from a purely "first-cause" argument than is the example of the house's maintenance above, because here the "first cause" is insufficient without the candle's or vessel's continued existence.
Thus, Aristotle's argument is in fieri, while Aquinas' argument is both in fieri and in esse (plus an additional argument from contingency). The distinction is an excellent example of the difference between a deistic view (Aristotle) and a theistic view (Aquinas). Leibnitz, who wrote more than two centuries before the "big bang" was taken as granted, is arguing in esse. As a general trend, the modern slants on the cosmological argument including the Kalam argument, tend to lean very strongly towards an in fieri argument.

Counterarguments and objections

Existence of a First Cause

Several objections to the cosmological argument have been raised. One objection is that it leaves open the question of why the First Cause is unique in that it doesn't require a cause. The premise that every effect requires a cause has been arrived at via a posteriori reasoning, which, being inductive, can support the conclusion but doesn't guarantee its truth. It may be argued that an infinite regression of causes is in fact possible, and, for the time being, Occam's Razor may be invoked at the Big Bang singularity.

Necessity of a First Cause

Opponents also point out that the cosmological argument seems to apply temporal concepts to situations outside of where physics can confirm time doesn't exist. "Cause" is commonly used as a temporal concept that requires time. When discussing "effects" or "causes" outside the known universe, ie. the "cause" of the universe, such descriptions are no longer based on any human concept of "time".

Identity of a First Cause

Another objection is that even if one accepts the argument as a proof of a First Cause, it doesn't identify this first cause with "God" in the theistic sense. The argument, as described above, doesn't ascribe to this First Cause some of the basic attributes commonly associated with "God", such as self-awareness and will, although there exist theistic arguments that also attempt to extract these attributes. Furthermore, the argument only requires God as a first cause, but need not require that God continue to interact with the universe beyond that purpose; in other words, it doesn't prove a provident God. This is the foundation for religions such as Deism that accept that a "God" created the universe, but then ceased to have any further interaction with it.

Aristotle and Dualism

The Aristotelian formulation of the argument held that the universe is of an essence or substance such that all things in the universe are caused: dependent and contingent. He postulated an alternative essence or substance that doesn't have the qualities of dependency or contingency and that, therefore, doesn't require a cause, but that itself may be the source upon which our natural, caused universe, is dependent, or contingent. In either case, though the "cause" isn't supernatural as the monotheistic form of the cosmological argument suggests, it is, nonetheless, "specialized" and yields to a form of naturalistic dualism (present-day natural conditions versus past natural conditions). Monotheistic innovations of the argument distinguish themselves by postulating that the dualism is supernatural and that whatever the "uncaused cause", it's the Divine.
Almost all physical cosmologists subscribe to a theory of universal origin that's effectively dualistic in nature and basically reflective of the Aristotlean reasoning underlying the original cosmological argument — they simply do so without making the jump to assume any spiritually supernatural qualities of a universe's dual source. This isn't special pleading as some have said, as special pleading applies to the same claiming to be different, not to the different, in fact, being different. On careful consideration of the big bang, for example, some sort of dualistic "cause", itself presumably not caused, or at least not caused by the "natural" forces manifest by current conditions in our universe, appears prima facie to be inescapable.
Understood as such, where the inherent dualism of the cosmological argument forces neither a naturalist (uncaused cause wasn't Divine) or supernaturalist (uncaused cause was Divine) conclusion, it's possible to formulate versions of the cosmological argument that lend to an atheistic conclusion.

Criticisms of counterarguments

   1. The cosmological argument as held by Aristotle, Aquinas, Maimonides and Averroes does not involve time. Their arguments concern immediate causation, as for example the will moving the hand moving the stick. The argument based on the assumptions of modern physics given above, on the other hand, involves serious problems. For example, if the motion of the stick is caused merely by a chain of locomotive acts emanating through time from the Big Bang, free will in man is destroyed.
   2. The cosmological argument is posited on the assumption that everything in the experience of our five physical senses is natural and that everything natural is caused, contingent and dependent — subject to cause by the uncaused cause.
   That includes time. Time is understood as "natural" in substance, while the uncaused cause is not natural and therefore not operable in time. for example: Aristotle, who first formulated the argument, believed the natural, caused universe was infinite, without beginning. Aquinas, who re-formulated the argument as a proof for monotheism, understood the Divine as outside of time, viewing all of time, indeed being present in all of time, simultaneously like a vast simulacrum

Gottfried Leibniz

Gottfried Leibniz stated the problem in his conclusion, although his terminology included some assumptions. If his principle of sufficient reason is indeed universally applicable, then the First Thing must either (1) be its own cause or (2) have a non-causal explanation. The non-causal explanation would either (a) make the First Thing's existence be in some way self-explanatory or (b) make it follow in an explanatory way from self-explanatory truths, such as the truths of logic.
   All three options have had defenders. Thus, option (1), the causa sui option, is defended by Descartes. Option (2a) is held by some of those like Aquinas who think that God's essence is identical with God's existence, or by those who hold, more weakly, that God's existence follows from his essence. Option (2b) essentially holds that there's a sound ontological argument for the existence of God, although we may not have discovered it yet. It follows from the principle of sufficient reason that one of the three options holds, but a defender of the Principle doesn't need to give an independent proof of any one of these options. It is, after all, the conclusion of the argument that one of these holds. In fact, this conclusion might be the starting point for responding to the problem of identifying the First Thing with God — that's how it's in Aquinas, for instance. Thus, if one could show the premises of the cosmological argument to be true and show that options (1) and (2a) were not tenable, then the cosmological argument would turn into an argument for the existence of an ontological argument. We would then know that there is a sound ontological argument, even if we didn't know what it is.
   Alternately, the defender of the cosmological argument can restrict the principle of sufficient reason in such a way that it doesn't require us to give an explanation of the existence of the First Thing. One such restriction would be to restrict the Principle only to require the explanation of contingent facts. Another is to restrict the Principle only to require the explanation of explainable facts. These restrictions would require arguments, respectively, that the universe is contingent or that the universe's existence is explicable.
   If the principle of sufficient reason doesn't hold, then the "selection" among potential alternatives must be random or a "brute fact". Defenders of the Principle will insist that neither option really makes sense.

Scientific positions

The argument for a Prime Mover is based on the scientific foundation of Newtonian physics and its earlier predecessors — the idea that a body at rest will remain at rest unless acted upon by an outside source. However, while Newton's ideas survive in physics since they conveniently and easily describe the movement of objects at the human (that is, not cosmic or atomic) level, they no longer represent the most accurate and truthful representations of the physical universe. Some scientists feel that the development of the laws of thermodynamics in the 19th century and quantum physics in the 20th century have weakened a purely scientific expression of the cosmological argument.
Modern physics has many examples of bodies being moved without any moving body, seriously undermining the first premise of the Prime Mover argument, that every object in motion must be moved by another object in motion. Physicist Michio Kaku directly addresses the cosmological argument in his book Hyperspace, saying it's easily dismissed by the laws of conservation of mass and energy and the laws governing molecular physics. He quotes one of many examples — "gas molecules may bounce against the walls of a container without requiring anything or anyone to get them moving." According to Kaku, these particles could move forever, without beginning or end. So, there's no need for a First Mover to explain the origins of motion. It doesn't provide an explanation for the reason those molecules exist in the first place however. Some argue a challenge to the cosmological argument is the nature of time. The Big Bang theory states that it's the point in which all dimensions came into being, the start of both space and time. Then, the question "What was there before the universe?" makes no sense; the concept of "before" becomes meaningless when considering a situation without time, and thus the concepts of cause and effects so necessary to the cosmological argument no longer apply. This has been put forward by Stephen Hawking, who said that asking what occurred before the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole. However many cosmologists and physicists do attempt to investigate what could have occurred before and caused the Big Bang, using such scenarios as the collision of branes to give a cause of the Big Bang, although such hypotheses are highly speculative.

Islamic view

The Islamic variant of the cosmological argument was originally developed by Averroes. Al-Ghazali refutes the idea of an eternal world and then uses that as a starting point for his first proof for God.
In essence, this argument states that the first cause, due to not being an effect of a cause preceding itself, must be independent of time and therefore space. This cause is referred as God and thus occur his characteristics of not being bounded by the space/time boundaries. The issue of his other attributes (including reason for creation) become a secondary matter.

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